Reasonable Inference
CTCL grant agreements in Georgia and other battleground states funded the deployment of private election consultants — including former federal and county election officials working through CTCL-affiliated NGOs — in operational roles inside local election offices. In Fulton County, Georgia, the consulting firm The Elections Group, founded by former Democratic county election officials, was embedded inside the county’s election operations for the 2020 general election, hand-count audit, recount, and Senate runoff — performing hands-on functions including signature verification, reprogramming of Election Day tabulators, logic-and-accuracy testing, and management of Dominion Voting Systems personnel. In Wisconsin, CTCL itself “put forth the idea” of embedding an operative from the National Vote at Home Institute inside Green Bay’s election office; that operative “appeared to supervise the counting of ballots” on Election Day and held keys to the central counting facility. CTCL’s grant terms required written approval before any outside help could be used, and CTCL typically provided election offices with its own partner organizations. These arrangements were structured to route through private grant funding — the Fulton County Attorney confirmed that The Elections Group “came to us on a grant. No agreement was signed with them. They were paid by the Elections Group. The county paid zero for them to be here.” This arrangement bypassed standard county procurement and placed operational control in the hands of individuals whose authorization was not approved by the county board of elections — the body vested by Georgia law with the powers of the election superintendent.
Citations
Complainants’ Supplemental and Amended Factual Response to Investigation Report of SEB2023-025, Georgia State Election Board, at pp. 8, 44–52 (hereinafter “SEB Factual Response”), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/753409824/KM-Ammended-Factual-Response; see also 2020 Election L&A Testing Complaint, Fulton County, Oct. 8, 2024, available at https://www.scribd.com/document/803314764/No-Logic-Accuracy-testing-and-Test-Ballots-were-counted-Complaint-Fulton-10-08-2024. These allegations originate from complainants whose prior claims the Secretary of State’s office has partially disputed; Macias testified in federal court proceedings in February 2026 on behalf of Fulton County and disputed that his involvement was improper. Ryan Macias’s prior federal role is confirmed at: Ryan Macias, Senior Election Technology Specialist, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/event_document/files/Req_T_A_Policy_Process_Ryan_Macias.pdf ; see also Election Task Force biography, https://electiontaskforce.org/people/ryan-macias/.
Elaine Mallon, *Zucked Up: Private Election Funding’s New Form*, The Spectator (July 25, 2022), https://spectator.com/article/zucked-up-private-election-fundings-new-form/ (“If a city wanted to use CTCL funding for outside help, it had to be approved by CTCL in writing. Typically, CTCL would provide election centers with one of their own partner organizations with which to work, and in some cases initiated this work unbidden. This was the case in Green Bay, Wisconsin…. It was CTCL that first put forth the idea of embedding Michael Spitzer-Rubenstein from the National Vote at Home Institute within various Wisconsin election offices. Spitzer-Rubenstein… had keys to the central counting facility ahead of election night. On Election Day, by all accounts it looked like Spitzer-Rubenstein was running the show — he appeared to supervise the counting of ballots, according to testimony given by Sandy Juno, clerk of Brown County.”).
SEB Factual Response at p. 46 (County Attorney statement: “The Elections Group came to us on a grant. No agreement was signed with them. They were paid by the Elections Group. The county paid zero for them to be here. They chose Fulton County. They would have to request records from them. No responsive records exist.”); id.at p. 44 (ORRs for contracts, agreements, payments, or proposals for Macias/Elections Group/RSM Technologies returned “no such records”; no records appear in BRE meeting minutes, agenda items, or resolutions).
Election Oversight Group (Kevin Moncla et al.), *Fulton County: Report of Investigation of the 2020 General Election* (Jan. 6, 2026) (263-page report; published by the Election Oversight Group and referenced in the FBI search warrant affidavit unsealed Feb. 10, 2026, available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2026-02-10-Unsealed-Affidavit.pdf) . The EOG Report contains findings regarding CTCL’s role in Fulton County election administration, including the allegation that “CTCL administered and controlled nearly all facets of the Fulton County 2020 General election” — a characterization reported by Democracy Docket (Apr. 13, 2026), https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/fbi-fulton-county-georgia-election-raid-deunked-election-oversight-group-report/. Georgia’s State Election Board, which reviewed earlier complaints by EOG authors, found no evidence of intentional misconduct; its contrary findings are noted but originate from a body with institutional interest in the administration it oversaw.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-40 (2024) (authorizing the General Assembly to create county boards of elections “empowered with the powers and duties of the election superintendent relating to the conduct of primaries and elections”), available at https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-21/chapter-2/article-2/part-1/subpart-2/section-21-2-40/ . The board of elections, as the legal election superintendent, is the body whose authorization is required before third-party consultants may exercise superintendent functions. Georgia subsequently enacted S.B. 202 (2021), codified at O.C.G.A. § 21-2-71(b): “No superintendent shall take or accept any funding, grants, or gifts from any source other than from the governing authority of the county or municipality, the State of Georgia, or the federal government.” S.B. 202 text at https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/legislation/document/20212022/201498 , at pp. 17–18 (§ 21-2-71(b)).