Prejudiced Jury Instructions in Coomer v Lindell (CO)

At trial in Coomer v. Lindell, the defense preserved multiple objections to the jury instructions as issued by Judge Wang. The defense objected that the adverse inference instruction regarding Tina Peters’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment improperly attributed inferences from a non-agent third party to Lindell, potentially prejudicing the jury’s view of him. The defense further objected that the conspiracy instruction — permitting the jury to infer agreement from “words or conduct” rather than an express meeting of the minds — risked a verdict on circumstantially weak evidence. The defense also challenged the willful and wanton instruction tied to exemplary damages as creating a risk of jury confusion between the punitive standard under Colorado law and the actual malice threshold required under federal constitutional defamation law. Additionally, defense counsel argued in a post-trial context that plaintiff’s closing improperly implied to the jury that Lindell’s honest belief in his statements was not a recognized defense, potentially contradicting the court’s own actual malice instruction. All such objections were preserved for appellate review.