Established Fact Tina Peters is the former Mesa County, CO clerk who was sentenced to nine years in prison for making forensic copies of her Dominion Election Management System (EMS) server in the wake of the 2020 election cycle. In so doing, Tina prevented the destruction of election records for both the 2020 and 2021 […]
Mesa County, CO Election System Discoveries Made Possible by Tina Peters Read More »
Established Fact After Fulton County, Pennsylvania commissioned an independent forensic examination of its Dominion voting equipment – an audit it was authorized to conduct under Pennsylvania law – the Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth decertified Fulton County’s voting machines on the stated basis that the county had permitted an independent inspector to access them. Fulton
Established Fact The EAC’s certification program, as documented by the Brennan Center’s November 2019 report, certifies voting systems against technical performance standards but does not require vendors to disclose: foreign connections or ownership structures; supply chain provenance of components; or embedded remote-access capabilities. This structural gap enabled ESS and Dominion to pass through the federal
Established Fact The EAC’s own investigation of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-B deployment in Williamson County, Tennessee documented anomalies in which close poll reports from 7 of 18 ICP tabulators did not match the number of ballots scanned – requiring correction through central count scanner re-tabulation. This is not a finding by election integrity advocates; it
Disputed Fact The Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth’s decertification of Fulton County’s Dominion machines, triggered solely by Fulton County’s exercise of its audit rights, effectively inverted the relationship between state oversight and local accountability. Under Pennsylvania election law, counties retain statutory authority to verify the integrity of election equipment under their custody. If the state
Retaliatory Decertification – State Punishes County for Exercising Audit Rights (PA) Read More »
Disputed Fact Together, illusory contracts, FOIA obstruction, and denials of access create a structural environment in which grave technical weaknesses can persist indefinitely without detection or remediation. Mesa County’s case demonstrates that unauthorized software (SSMS), global SQL exposure, disabled logging, and mass deletion of audit trails can coexist with EAC/VSTL “certification” and state assurances precisely
Disputed Fact CISA’s Cyber Risk Assessment depicts U.S. election infrastructure as a highly networked, variably secured critical infrastructure ecosystem with persistent, exploitable weaknesses, while the EAC’s election system oversight is narrowly product centric, episodic, and largely detached from those systemic cyber risk realities. Unlike other critical infrastructure systems, there are no failure modes and effects
Disputed Fact CISA’s Cyber Risk Assessment depicts U.S. election infrastructure as a highly networked, variably secured critical infrastructure ecosystem with persistent, exploitable weaknesses, while the EAC’s election system oversight is narrowly product centric, episodic, and largely detached from those systemic cyber risk realities. Unlike other critical infrastructure systems, there are no failure modes and effects
EAC lacks analysis rigor sufficient for critical infrastructure (US) Read More »
Disputed Fact The latest VVSG 2.0 standard features the following security gaps: • System boundary: focuses on the voting device and EMS, not the full enterprise and vendor environments.• Operational security: limited guidance on continuous monitoring, vulnerability management, and incident response.• Identity and access: no full RBAC requirement and constrained, fragmented MFA implementation relative to
EAC features significant security gaps (US) Read More »
